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CLINKSCALES

v.

[L. A. No. 18480. In Bank.

CARVER

[22 C.2d

Apr. 29, 1943.]

LOIS A. CLINKSCALES et al., Respondents, v. HERMAN
ROLAND CARVER, Appellant.
[la, Ib] Automobiles,-Actions-Instructions,-Care of OperatorViolation of Regulation-Boulevard Stops.-In an, action for
wrongful death resulting from a collision of automobiles at an
intersection, it was not prejudicial error t9 instruct the, jury
to return a verdict for plaintiffs if defendant failed to observe
a boulevard stop-sign before entering the intersElction and if
such fail1;tre proximately caused the accident, notwithstanding
the fact that there was no official authorization for the erection of such sign, as the question of defendant's negligence
would not turn upon the irregularity of, the authorization or
the effect of such irregularity on his criminal liability.
[2] Torts,-How Liability Arises.-A statute that provides for a
criminal proceeding only does not create a civil liability, and
a suit for damages predicated on said act is based on the
theory that the conduct inflicting,the injuries is a common-law
tort.

•

I

!

[3] Negligence-Basis of Liability~Signillcance of Criminal Sta~~
ute.-The significance of a criminal statute in a civil suit for
negligence lies in its formulation of a standard of conduct
that the court adopts in the determination of such liability.
Unless the court accepts the standard formulated by such,
statute as the standard to determine civil liability, the, case'
goes to the jury, which must determine whether the defen~'
dant has acted a,s a reasonably prudent man, would have in
similar cireumstances.
[4]

I,

I

I

Id.~Violation

of Statutes or Ordinances-Basis of Liability.""-,
When a legislative body has generalized a ,standard frOID the
experience of the community and prohibits conduct' that is
likely to cause harm, the court may accept and'apply the
formulated' standard except where it would serve to impose
liability without fault. Even if the conduct cannot be- punished criminally because of irregularities in the adoption . of
the prohibitory proVisions, thldegislative standard IDay apply

[3] See 19 Cal.Jur. 545; 38 Am.Jur. 650.
[4J See 19 Cal.Jur. 632; 38 Am.Jur. 827.
:McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, §319; [2] Torts, § Ii
[3] Negligence, § 1; [4] Negligence, § 89; [5] Automobiles,§ 106~

..
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where it is an appropriate measure for the defendant's eonduct, and in accepting such standard the court 'rules in e1Ieat
that defendant's conduct falls below that of a reasonable m~n.
[5] Automobiles-Conduct of Operator--StopptD.g-PaUure to Ob~ 'serve. Stop Sign.~Failuret9 observe a stop-sign is urir~aso~
ably dangerous conduct whether or not the driver is itnin'une
from crUninal prosecution because of some, m.:egularity i~
the crection of the sign. Such irregularity does' not relieve
a person from the, duty to exercise, the care of a reasonable
'man under such circumstances.
'

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County. Vaughn N. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
'
Action for damages for death resulting from an automo.
bile collision. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Hickcox &'Provence and Ross T. Hickcox for Appellant.
Syril S. Tipton and John J. Ford for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J ...--This, action was brought to recover damages for a death caused by an automobiie,;collision: that
occurred May 20, 1937, at the; intersection of Highline' Road'
and Oat Canal Road in ImperiaLCounty. The defendantwss
driving north on Highlin,e Road~s 'RichardGlinks~ales; ithe,
~l1sband of, onephiinti:tr and father of th~,other~ iW8:s :proeeed;.
mg 'Yest on Oat CandRoad.' There was: a stop-sign' at:' the: .
intersection on Highline Road, placed there il:i:1936 bY, a roAd
fore~ah, with the ,permission ofthesupervisbr':of that'distiict,
to' gIve gravel trucks the right of ·wa.y"on) OatiOahalRoad/
Although ~h~ defendant was ,familiar; with ;this"sign:' ile:~,did
not stop' hIS car before entering theintersection~,~iHenooked
inbot.h direc~i~ns but !lid not see tJ:ie'othel'ca.r:c~ming. The,
resultmg colluuon caused the death of Richard :Clinkscales;
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a'verdict' of
'.;:
; ,
the:ju,ry in: favor of plaintiffs.
, [lal The defendant, contends that'thestop-signwas placed
on Highline Road at this intElrsect~oIi ille'ga:Qy;and :tiiaff!the'
trial court's instructions on that ,queStionw-ere 'prejudici!ill-i
errone?us. The court instructed t1J.e jurY, that'any"pe~s6n '
operatmg' a ,motor vehicle in a northerly direction' On', High.'
o

" "

"
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[5] See 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPP. 323,349;5 Am.J~. 661.'
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line Road at the intersection with Oat Canal Road was required to stop before entering it, by virtue of a resolution of
the Board of Supervisors of Imperial County adopted on
January 4, 1927, and section 577 of the Vehicle Code' that
the right of way was controlled by section 552 of the V~hicle
C~de; and t~atif defendant failed to make the stop and this
failure proXImately caused the accident the verdict should
be in ·favor of the plaintiffs.
At the time of the accident section 577 of the Vehicle
Code p~ovided: "Veh~cles Must Stop at Through Highways.
Th: drIver of .any vehIcle upon approaching any entrance of
a .hIgh~ay ~r Intersection signposted with a stop-sign as proVlde~ In thIS co?e shall stop at such sign before entering. or
crOSSIng such hIghway or Intersection." Section' 552 of the
Vehicle Code provided: "Vehicle Entering Through Highway ..The driver of any vehicle which has stopped as required
by th~s code at the entrance to a through highway shall yield
the rIght of way to other vehicles which have entered the
~ntersection from the through highway or which are approach~ng so. closely on the through highway as to constitute an
ImmedIate hazard,. but said driver having so yielded may
proceed ~nd the drIvers of all other vehicles approaching the
IntersectIOn on the through highway shall yield the right of
w,ay to the vehicle so about to enter or crOSR the through
.
hIghway. "
The resolution of January 4,1927, provided: "It is hereby
resol,ved, found and ordered that the general safety of the
publIc and the proper and reasonable regulation and control
of traffic on the public roads and highways in this county
and outside of incorporated cities and towns require the
establishment of 'Boulevard stops' at all roads intersecting
all county and state highways in Imperial County outside of
incorporated ~ities and to~ns,. and such •Boulevard stoPE!' are
hereby.estabhshe~ at saId Intersections as provided and
author.Ized by OrdInance No. 82 of this County."
OrdInance 82, referred to in the resolution had been passed
by the board on July 10, 1926, but never became effective
because of admitted defects in publication. Defendant contends that since the resolution orders the establishment of
boulevard stops •• as provided and authorized by Ordinance
No. 82!" ~hich was not legally adopted, there was no legal
authorIzatIOn for the stop sign, and that the instructions were
therefore prejudicially erroneous.
This contention would make the. question of negligence
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per se turn upon the irregularity of .the authorizatio~.:Wlia#'
ever the efIectof the irregularity on 'defend~t'$lciirolrialli~,:
bility, it cannot be assumed that the conditions.that lim~~it
also limit civil liability. Theproprieiyof taking' trom,' t1ie~
jury t~: d~ter~in~t~onof negligencie doesh~t~urIl"on defe~~~:

ant's crImInalliabIhty. [2] A statute thatproVldesfQl'a ci'ln1-,
inal proceeding only does not create civillia:bility;jftherIHs:
no provision for a remedy by civil ~ctiori to persons injured'
by a breach of the statute it is because the Legislatlire did ~6t
contemplate one; A suit for damages is based 'on the theory.
.that the conduct inflicting the injurlesis a· comInon~law tort;
in this case the failure to exercise the care of Ii reasohable
man at a boulevard stop. [31The significance of the statute in a
civil suit for negligence lies in its formulation of a standard
of conduct, that the court adopts in the determination of 'such
liability. (See Holmes, The Common Law, 120-129; Morris,
The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liab~'lity; 46 Harv.
L.Rev. 453.) The decision as to what'the civil standa~d
should be still rests' with the court, and the standard formulated bya legislative body in a police regulation Of:' criniin~r
statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only
because. the ('ourt accepts it. In the absence of such a standard
the case goes to the jury, which must determine :whether the,
defendant has acted as a reasonably prudent. man would act
in siinilar circumstances. The;lury then has. the burden of
. deciding not only what the facts are but wpat the umQrmuIated standard is of reasonable conduct. [4] When a legislative
body has generalized a standard from the experience of ihe
community and prohibits conduct that is likely to cause harm,
the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them
. (Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418; Cragg, v. Los Angeles Tr'Ust
Co., 154 ·Cal. 663 [98 P. 1063 16 .Ann.Cas., 1061].; see cases
cited in 19 Cal.Jur. 632 et seq., Osborne v. McMasters, '40
Minn. 103 [41 N.W.543, 12 Am.St.Rep.698]; see Restate~
ment: Torts, sec. 286), except where theyw0;nld, .!'Ierva, to
impose liability without fault. (Berkovitz v. American' R~ve.r .
Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195 [215 P. 675] ; Burlie ..v. ,St,ephens;
113 Wash. 182 [193 P. 684] ; Tedla v. ElZma~, 280 N.Y: 1.24.
[19 N.E.2d 987] ; see 13Cal.L.Rev. 428; 37 Mich~L.Rev. 81L)
Even if the conduct cannot be punished criminally because of irregularities in the adoption of the prohibitory:
provisions, the legislative standard may neverthelefils. apply if
it is an appropriate measure for the defendanfs conduct,:

a

[ ,~

"
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When the court ac~epts the standard it rules in' effect that
defendant's conduct falls below that of a reasonable man as
the court conceives it. It' does no more than It does in any
ruling that certain acts or omissions amount as a matter of
law to negligence. (Restatement : Torts, sec. 285.) [lblAriappellate court is concerned with determining whether thc trial
court arrived at a ,proper standard in a particular case. In
this case the trial court rightly instructed the jury that measured by the standard set up by the resolution of the board of
supervisors and the Vehicle Code it was negligence' as a
matter of law to disregard the stop-sign. [5] Failure to observe
a stop~sign is unreasonably dangerous conduct whetheroi" not
the driver is immune from criminal prosecution because of
some irregularity in the erection of the stop-sigil.Ifa through
artery has been posted with stop-signs by the public authorities in the customarY way and to all appearances by regular
procedure, any reasonable man should know that the public
naturally relies upon their observance. If a driver from a side
street enters the ostensibly protected boulevard without stopping, in disregard. of the posted safeguards, contrary to what
drivers thereoh could reasonably have expected him to do he
is guilty of negligence regardless of ariy irregularity att~nd
ing the authorization of the signs. (Oomfort v. Penner, 166
Wash. 177 [6P.2d 604] ; Mayfield v. Orowdus;38 N.M.471[35
P.2d291] ; Fothergill v. Kaija, 183 Wash. 112 [48P.2d 643,
53 P.2d 1198]; Flood v.Miura, 120 Cal.App. 467 [8 P.2d
552]:) Such irregularity does not relieve a person from the
duty to exercise the care of a reasonable man under such ,circumstances. Othei"wisea stop-'sign would become a trap for
innocent persons who rely upon it.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson,C. J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and. Peters, J; pro tem.,
concurred.
.
SHENK,J.,-I dissent......,.The triaJ court instructed the jury
that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of
law if he f/!.iled to stop on Highline Road at its intersection
with Oat Canal Road. The. basis for the instruction \Vas the
false~ssttID.ptionthat lHgliIine R<?ad was signposted' with a
stOP-SIgn as then provided.by section 577 of the 'Vehicle Code.
There was no stop.;gign so posted. Some stop signal was in~
stalled at the intersection but without any legal authorization
therefor. The question of the defendant's negligence under
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the circumstances was, in my opinion, a question of fact for
the jury. The cases cited in the 'majority opinion go no
further than to hold that the jury may consider the existence
of a so-called de facto stop-sign in determining the question
of the defendant's negligence. The withdrawal of that issue
from the jury in the present case was manifestly 'prejudicial.
At the time of the impact the Clinkscales car was traveling
on the left or wrong side of the road and, from thee'Vidence
of the physical facts, must have been going at an excessive
rate of speed. Freed from the erroneous instruction the' jury
might well have found that the negligence of the deceased
'was the sole proximate cause of the collision.
Edmonds, J., concurred. ,

[L. A., No. 18391. In Bank., Apr. 30, 1943.]

A. CAMINETTI, JR., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Appellant, v. THE PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation)
et aI., Respondents.
[L. A. No. 18396. In Bank. Apr.

3~,

1943.]

A. CAMINETTI, JR., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Peti, tioner, v. THE PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a CorporatIon) et al.,
Respondents; JOHN HARNISH, Appellant.
[1] Insurance-Corporations-Rebbilitation-Olaims of Old Poli-

c:yholders.-Where assets of an insurance company ~er~. transferred to a new company pursuant to a rehabilitation and reinsurance agreement giving the policyholders· of the, .old company an option to accept or reject. the rein~urancewithin a
certain period and declaring that a failure to give the,~ew company written notice of their rejection woUld be, deemed.an acceptance, and where an order of liquidation alsc>
such policyholders the right to 1lIe claims for breach of their,policiesithe
, . ,I,.::

gave

[1] See 14 Cal.Jur. 646, 660; 29 Am.Jur. 96, loi7.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Insurance,§ ll;· [3J Insur-

~~§~"

